

Whole-Field Constitution as Enacted Organization

Jeremy Rodgers

Independent Researcher

www.everythingequation.com

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23608069

23 October 2026

Abstract

An account of experience must explain how interpreted contributions constitute one current occurrence rather than merely interact. Enacted scaffolding identifies that occurrence with the complete qualifying organization actually enacted within an interpretive unit. This paper develops the within-unit account through three explicit principles: complete-enactment identity, current incorporation and unit unity. Reception, interpretation, consolidation, operative retention and uptake must participate in one linked construction. A typed realization witness expresses this requirement while allowing overlapping roles and distributed implementation. Current incorporation distinguishes an interpreted contribution from a dormant trace, a formative influence and a capacity for later retrieval. A constitutive result then identifies the unit's complete actual enactment with its occurrence, without a further experiential product or a separate observer receiving it. Scent, recollection and melody illustrate how source roles, affective qualification and temporal differentiation belong to the organization of a field. The account separates phenomenal contents, their complete realizing organization and numerical occurrence identity. Common-prefix invariance explains why later loss does not erase an earlier occurrence. Precise completeness and factorization results distinguish the whole from partial content summaries and preserve the complete predictive commitment where SPC-2 is jointly invoked. The result is a conditional constitutive account for an independently warranted qualifying unit: its current field is the interpreted organization enacted there, rather than an additional object produced after that organization is complete.

Keywords: consciousness; enacted scaffolding; whole-field constitution; phenomenal unity; actual uptake; Shadow Theory.

1 The experiencing occurrence and its organization

A scent can be encountered as familiar, affectively qualified and accompanied by a recollection experienced as remembered. These are not simply three values simultaneously registered by separate mechanisms. Familiarity qualifies the present encounter; the recollection concerns another occasion; its remembered character distinguishes it from something happening again. An account of this occurrence must preserve how the contributions belong together, as well as which contributions are present.

The same requirement applies to a melody. A retained note, a currently received note and an anticipated continuation can participate in one unfolding encounter while occupying different temporal roles. Their physical carriers may be jointly available without the notes being represented as simultaneous. What requires explanation is the enacted relation among them, not merely the existence of several traces.

The distinction between a contribution and a complete occurrence is central. A mechanism that binds a scent to a familiarity response can be indispensable to the encounter without exhausting its current organization. Conversely, surrounding that mechanism with a larger container does not, by itself, establish another experiential whole. The relevant target is the actual organization of the qualifying unit, including the interpreted relations through which its contributions participate in the occasion.

Enacted scaffolding identifies experience with that complete qualifying organization, rather than with a further product delivered after processing (Rodgers, 2026d,e). The identity includes experienced character. It does not leave a completed representation waiting to become experiential through inspection by an additional observer. Its explanatory task is instead to specify the organization being identified, the way contributions enter it, and the sense in which it is a whole.

This paper develops that task through three principles with distinct functions. *Complete-enactment identity* specifies what the occurrence is. *Current incorporation* specifies how interpreted contributions participate in its present organization. *Unit unity* assigns one perspective to the coordinated enactment of the qualifying unit at the stated scope. A linked realization witness makes the operative requirement explicit: the relevant roles must be realized together in the same construction, rather than found independently somewhere within a containing apparatus.

The resulting within-unit account relates physical enactment and phenomenal organization without confusing them with a list of outputs. It also distinguishes present incorporation from retained scaffolding and later recollection. Its formal results establish the consequences of the adopted constitutive principles, clarify what counts as an incomplete account of the fixed occurrence, and preserve earlier occurrence against later record loss. The scent and melody cases show how these distinctions support a sustained explanation of a current field.

2 Framework: unit, enactment and constitution

2.1 The interpretive unit and its actual activity

Shadow Theory treats the unknown ground as fundamental and uses awareness provisionally for a quality attributed to it. Localized experiencing is understood through organized manifestation, rather than the manufacture of a new fundamental substance. The ground is not identified with an already individuated universal subject. The constitutive question addressed here concerns the organization of localized experience.

Let A be a qualifying interpretive unit and let J scope its relevant activity. For the human application, A is the embodied person with the requisite organization of interpretation, integration, retention and access. The activity is physically implemented and situated: its operative distinctions, source relationships, acquired scaffolding and relevant history belong to its specification (Rodgers, 2026e, §§2.1–2.3).

Write $K_A(J)$ for the complete qualifying enactment at that scope. It is an actual activity or process token, not merely a formal description, the entire enduring person, or a set of unexecuted future events. Its organization includes the instantiated capacities, relevant dispositions, implementation and contextual relations required by the constitutive account. A reduced model of a response can therefore omit relevant organization even when it predicts that response correctly.

The scope is fixed as follows. This is a constitutive account *within an independently warranted qualifying unit*, with an admissible operative history and a complete relevant realization. Complete-enactment identity, current incorporation and unit unity are explicit framework premises. They determine the occurrence attributed to that unit; they are not a universal rule for selecting units. The human application follows the independently qualifying adult construction of Rodgers (2026b, §4.1). Its operative formative history is preserved as an input to the application.

2.2 Three constitutive principles

Constitutive principle 2.1 (Complete-enactment identity). *For a qualifying interpretive unit A at scope J , the complete relevant organization actually enacted as $K_A(J)$ is the experiencing occurrence, including its experiential character. No additional experiential product or observer converts that complete enactment into experience.*

Constitutive principle 2.2 (Current incorporation). *Within that enactment, the interpreted contributions and relations actually taken up in the unit's current construction constitute its current experiential organization. Retention, availability or causal influence alone does not establish current incorporation.*

Constitutive principle 2.3 (Unit unity). *At a fixed stage and grain, the coordinated qualifying enactment of A sustains one perspective. Distinguishable contributions, modalities and descriptions within that enactment do not independently multiply the perspective.*

These principles perform different work. Identity concerns the occurrence itself; incorporation concerns the roles of its current contents; unity concerns their organization as one perspective. The identity and unit rule are stated in the enacted-scaffolding account (Rodgers, 2026d, §§7.4–7.7); actual uptake specifies the relevant incorporation relation (Rodgers, 2026e, §2.2). Their distinction prevents the presence of a content, its physical support and the whole occurrence from being treated as interchangeable.

Unit unity applies to actual organization, not to an outline around unrelated processes. A common power supply, controller or enclosure does not supply the conjoint interpretation to which the principle refers. Similarly, phenomenal unity must be distinguished from joint accessibility: the relations by which contributions are experienced together are not established merely by their availability to the same reporting operation (Bayne and Chalmers, 2003).

Interpretation can be automatic, immediate and nonverbal. Current incorporation need not involve naming the occurrence, deliberately reflecting on it or placing it within an explicit self-story. Reflective recognition and psychological appropriation are possible additional organizations of experience, not a separate observer required by the identity principle (Rodgers, 2026b, §4.3).

3 Current incorporation and operative scaffolding

Let D denote actual reception or internal retrieval, I interpretation through operative distinctions, C consolidation of relevant relations, M retention sufficient for their use, and U actual interpretive uptake. These are functional roles within an activity. They need not be five modules or a fixed serial sequence. One physical operation can perform several roles, while distributed operations can jointly perform one role.

In uptake, what has become available participates as an interpreted contribution in ongoing recognition, relating, appraisal, orientation or response organization. A residue that changes a threshold does not, by that fact alone, establish this relation. An image or bodily response can nevertheless enter current interpretation without the person identifying the unconscious association that produced it. The interpreted response and its inaccessible formative cause occupy different roles.

Three distinctions organize the account. First, a retained disposition can shape interpretation without appearing as a recollection. Second, a representation can be accessible without actually being read or used. Third, actual use can occur without deliberate endorsement or practical authority. A heard sound need not be accepted as a reason for action in order to participate in experience.

The mechanism developed in Rodgers (2026a, §§11–13) makes related distinctions precise. A retained model can be unread; it can be assessed while its installation route remains blocked; downstream compensation can reproduce successful performance without changing the authority of the original recommendation. Its neutral-write control can match raw success without acquiring the self-mechanism model. These comparisons show why a successful output cannot substitute for the actual organization of acquisition, interpretation and use. Practical authority is relevant to agency, while the present account concerns the broader relation of current interpreted incorporation.

Let R_{later} denote the capacity for later addressed retrieval. It is distinct from current uptake U . A construction can be taken up now and later become irretrievable; an unused retrieval route does not establish uptake now. Operative retention M need only preserve the contribution sufficiently for its actual use. A later recollection is another current construction concerning the earlier occasion, rather than a necessary acknowledgment completing that occasion (Rodgers, 2026e, §2.2).

The complete organization K_A is richer than the inventory of foreground contents. A learned disposition, an implementation condition and a currently recalled image need not have the same constitutive role. The account therefore distinguishes *what realizes and organizes the occurrence* from *what is currently incorporated as interpreted content*. That distinction permits memory and acquired scaffolding to matter without making every retained item something presently remembered.

4 Linked realization of one construction

A list of capacities does not specify their organization. Consider a container holding a sensor, a word interpreter, an unrelated binding process, an archive and a controller using another input. Each role occurs somewhere, but no single construction is thereby received, interpreted, consolidated, retained and taken up. The required relation is not simply

$$\bigwedge_{r \in \{D, I, C, M, U\}} \exists k_r W_r(A, k_r). \quad (1)$$

It requires one compatible realization of the relevant construction. Even attaching the same identifier k to all five components supplies no actual relation between their operations.

Definition 4.1 (Linked realization witness). *Let $\mathcal{R}_k$ be a typed role structure for a construction k . Its nodes specify required role instances; its relations specify operative source and occasion binding, retained-carrier availability, and actual recruitment or producer-to-consumer routes. Let $\mathcal{P}_{A,J}$ be the actual process structure of unit A over activity J , including event tokens, operation ports, retained carriers, causal order and relevant boundary conditions. A linked realization witness is a map*

$$w : \mathcal{R}_k \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}_{A,J} \quad (2)$$

preserving the required types and actual relations under the declared realization contract.

The map need not be injective. Role overlap and distributed realization are therefore permitted. A template for a temporally extended construction can place several roles in one implemented operation while specifying the internal relations that operation realizes. When one event requires another event's output, the route and physical ordering must support its actual use. A retained contribution must have an operative carrier, not merely an analyst's inferred history.

Source and occasion binding make the requirement stronger than the transport of values. The same value can participate as a live estimate, a memory or an anticipation. A faithful witness preserves whichever relation is asserted in the construction. Likewise, an externally imposed probe is distinguished from the endogenous operation that actually uses a contribution. The semantic calibration of the roles belongs to the application; the map records their implemented relations.

Lemma 4.2 (Linked realization and separate capacities). *A linked realization witness supplies instances of its required roles. The existence of each role somewhere in an apparatus does not generally supply such a witness, even when the role instances carry matching written identifiers.*

Proof. A type- and relation-preserving map supplies the images of every required node and relation. Conversely, take isolated events with the five role types and no operative edges between them. The separate role predicates hold, but a template requiring a cross-role use relation has no witness. Matching identifiers leave the missing physical relations unchanged. $\square$

The witness expresses the difference between a construction and a collection of ingredients. Its significance for experience follows from the constitutive principles, while its physical content concerns actual relations that a realization must preserve. Two constructions can each be linked without belonging to a conjoint construction of the whole unit. The unit-wide account must specify the wider organization, including actual relations among the incorporated constructions, rather than infer it from their common enclosure.

5 Whole-field constitution

Fix a current stage t at the chosen activity scope. Let $\mathcal{W}_A(t)$ collect the incorporated construction witnesses of A , together with their bindings. Shared-source relations, temporal modes, affective qualifications and actual recruitment remain part of the structure. The collection is not an unordered bag.

Let $K_A(t)$ denote the complete actual enactment at this scope, as specified in Section 2. Its current interpreted organization is written

$$\text{Cur}_A(t) = \pi_{\text{cur}}(K_A(t), \mathcal{W}_A(t)). \quad (3)$$

Here π_{cur} denotes the constitutive correspondence for current incorporation. Its application requires the actual witnesses and their interpreted roles; it is not a task-output summary. The notation separates current content from the complete organization realizing and organizing it.

Completeness is relative to the specified unit and target. An account is constitutively complete when it preserves all organization relevant to that occurrence under the adopted law. Establishing that a physical inventory meets this condition is an evidential matter. A shorter faithful representation can preserve the relevant relations; brevity alone does not make it incomplete. What matters is the omission of a constituent or relation required by the target.

Proposition 5.1 (Within-unit constitutive closure). *Fix a stage, activity scope and grain. Assume that:*

- (i) *A is an independently warranted qualifying interpretive unit with an admissible operative history;*
- (ii) *K_A specifies its complete relevant actual enactment, including the linked constructions, bindings and constitutive realization, rather than only a task projection;*
- (iii) *Principles 2.1–2.3 apply to this organization.*

Then the experiencing occurrence attributed to A is K_A itself, and its current experiential organization is given by actual incorporation as in Eq. (3). An account omitting an actual constituent or relation required by that occurrence does not exhaust it. No further experiential product or separate observer is required after the complete qualifying enactment.

Proof. The first two assumptions fix the unit and the complete target organization. Complete-enactment identity identifies that actual organization with the occurrence, rather than with a causal predecessor awaiting another experiential output. Current incorporation specifies the interpreted contributions and relations participating in its present organization. Unit unity makes their coordinated enactment one perspective at the fixed scope. An account that omits a constituent or relation required by that organization cannot exhaust the same target. A further conversion or observer is not an operation left unsupplied by these premises: it would add a condition to the adopted constitutive identity. $\square$

The proposition states the consequence of the three principles together. The physical organization is specified by the unit and realization premises; the principles identify its experiential significance. In this sense, the account completes the whole without placing another object or recipient beyond its enactment. A causal contribution has not been mistaken for the complete occurrence, because the target includes the other actually incorporated relations of the unit.

The whole is relational as well as inclusive. Merely preserving the values of several contributions need not preserve which one qualifies another, which occasion a recollection concerns, or which signal is anticipated. Those relations belong to the current interpreted construction. Their presence gives the whole its organization, rather than adding an unstructured total to otherwise independent ingredients.

6 Scent, recollection and melody

6.1 A currently qualified encounter

Consider a present scent that is affectively qualified and accompanied by a recollection experienced as remembered. The case is a philosophical construction used to distinguish roles.

The scent's physical cause, the acquired disposition producing familiarity, the represented past occasion and the current recollection are different contributions to its description.

Suppose the recollection is actually taken up within the encounter. The complete current organization then includes not only a scent value and a memory value but the relation through which the latter appears as remembered in the present occasion. Familiarity can qualify the scent without presenting the entire history that formed the disposition. A bodily or affective response can participate without its formative association being explicitly identified.

A local mechanism O may realize the familiarity relation. If the unit's current construction also includes the recollection and its qualification of the encounter, O does not exhaust the occurrence merely because familiarity is indispensable. The relevant difference is actual incorporation of another constituent and its relations within A , not the discovery of another stored record elsewhere. Conversely, familiarity by itself supplies no reason to add an unoccurring recollection to the field.

The account locates these distinctions in the enacted organization. An alteration that changes a remembered contribution into a live perception changes its occasion role even if selected ingredient values remain fixed. A change of source attribution can similarly alter what the contribution means in the encounter. The linked witness must track those relations; a value-only summary cannot determine them.

6.2 Temporal differentiation within one activity

A melody provides an explicit temporal instance. A listener receives a note, retains its operative contribution and interprets a subsequent note as following it while anticipating a possible continuation. Retained predecessor, live estimate and anticipation are jointly available in the current construction, but have different modes (Rodgers, 2026e, §§3–4).

The organization can be expressed schematically as

$$(c_{\text{ret}}, e_{\text{live}}, g_{\text{ant}}; c \prec_{\text{rep}} e, \text{common stream, actual uptake}). \quad (4)$$

The semicolon separates contribution values and modes from their interpreted relations. The notation does not require the listener to name pitches or formulate a proposition about before and after. Implicit recognition and relating can enact the transition.

An order-insensitive code cannot distinguish a sequence from its reversal under a fixed readout. An ordered archive, however, can remain dormant; a retained note can be attributed to another stream; sequential contributions can be interpreted as fusion rather than the specified succession. The construction therefore requires source binding, temporal differentiation and actual use in addition to retained order information.

Under the constitutive identity, receiving, retaining, relating and taking up these contributions constitute the experienced transition within the qualifying listener. The activity need not wait for the whole melody and deliver a finished display to another observer. Nor does current anticipation require an actual signal from the future. It is a present disposition or interpreted contribution concerning a possible continuation. The relevant delivery routes, retention and timing remain physical requirements (Rodgers, 2026b, §§4–6).

These cases show how the whole can be temporally and qualitatively differentiated without fragmenting into unrelated ingredients. What is experienced together includes the different roles in which contributions are taken up, not a claim that their sources occurred simultaneously.

7 Constitutive extent and numerical occurrence identity

An actual realization must distinguish current constituents from support and formative influence. A past encounter can form a disposition without remaining a current implementing event. A remote process can support an operation or participate directly in its constitution, depending on the realized relations. Indispensability alone does not decide current content or physical membership. The complete realization identifies the relations required by the account, including their implementation, rather than simply collecting every cause in the unit's ancestry.

Physical containment is a different relation. Suppose O has dynamics T_u^O and a containing apparatus H adds a record state z :

$$T_u^H(o, z) = (T_u^O(o), G_u(o, z)). \quad (5)$$

Projection to o preserves the original trajectory. The record can concern the enactment without being taken up in a conjoint interpretation at the containing scale. An additional enclosure or recording channel therefore does not establish another experiencing unit. Conversely, a description confined to O is incomplete for the nominated A occurrence if it omits an actual constituent or constitutive relation of K_A . These are judgments about actual organization, not about how many boxes an observer draws.

Numerical identity also differs from structural description. On the adopted identity, $e_A = K_A$ denotes the same actual occurrence, not merely an isomorphic type. Two descriptions of that token do not create another occurrence. Two separately enacted tokens can have matching organization and contents without becoming numerically identical. Counting requires actual token identity; a matching label, formal pattern or report is insufficient.

The present perspective is identified with the qualifying enactment rather than assigned to a further owner behind it. This is part of the constitutive account, not a derivation of owner identity from an ordinary event-counting rule. Within the fixed unit, the distinction between an aspect and the whole is made by actual incorporation and completeness. A claim about another unit requires its own qualification and realization; containment alone settles neither its admission nor a universal exclusivity claim.

8 Common-prefix invariance and later loss

An occurrence can be temporally extended while depending on organization enacted by its current stage. Reception, retention and uptake occupy physical events and need not be compressed into a universal simultaneous slice. Let $\Gamma_A(t)$ denote the complete relevant enacted prefix for the scoped assignment, including the unit, operative history, relevant realization and constitutive boundary facts. Qualification and experiential organization are evaluated by fixed constitutive maps on this complete argument.

Proposition 8.1 (Common-prefix invariance). *If two histories agree on $\Gamma_A(t)$ under the same constitutive maps, they receive the same assignment for the occurrence at t . A later loss of its record or later addressed retrieval cannot alter that earlier assignment.*

Proof. The maps are applied to equal complete arguments and therefore have equal values. Later events can alter later arguments, including later access to the occurrence, without changing the assignment to the common earlier prefix. $\square$

The relevant agreement includes operative organization, not merely matching answers or a neural snapshot. Where full A2 is jointly invoked, it includes the native continuation contract,

relevant dispositions and actual predictive point. These are features of the organization at the stage, not a requirement that future actual events already be received or that later acknowledgment complete the earlier experience.

This result gives later recollection its proper role. A trace lost after uptake changes what can subsequently be retrieved. It does not remove the earlier uptake or its occurrence. A construction first taken up during later reconstruction is a later experience concerning an earlier event; it does not supply an experience retrospectively. Optional R_{later} thus preserves the distinction between the occurrence and subsequent evidence or access to it.

Current unity and temporal continuation remain distinct. A melody can change in content within a continuing activity; a retained record can persist across an interruption. Neither fact alone supplies the identity of every temporal segment. The present result concerns invariance of the fixed earlier occurrence under continuations preserving its complete constitutive prefix.

9 Complete organization and the predictive framework

SPC-2 assigns perspectives through A1, complete phenomenal organization through A2 and nonbranching continuation through A3 on its specified physical realization (Rodgers, 2026c, chs. 16–17). The enacted-scaffolding formulation is not proved equivalent to those laws (Rodgers, 2026b, §4.4). The present account supplies within-unit constitution through its explicit principles. A joint application requires the independently justified correspondence between the qualifying unit, its realizing organization and the SPC-2 assignment.

Full A2 identifies complete phenomenal organization with the complete endogenous predictive object, pointed by the realized predictive class. Native operation and record labels, all finite admitted continuations and the successor structure belong to that object. A current task state, passive trace or final response cannot replace it. Accordingly, Cur_A in Eq. (3) is a current-incorporation projection, not a substitute for complete organization.

This yields a precise compatibility requirement. For an exact intrinsic carrier X with a fixed native contract, let $q_\infty : X \rightarrow Z_\infty$ be its complete native predictive quotient. Any fixed phenomenal property attributed jointly under A2 and the enacted correspondence must be constant on q_∞ fibres. Appendix B states and proves this criterion. Equal current foregrounds can coexist with differences in complete organization; a dormant disposition need not be explicitly recalled in order to remain part of the relevant native structure.

The same distinction explains why an inventory of present items is not the whole account. The inventory abstracts from roles, modes, realization and token identity. Appendix A establishes exactly what finite existential content summaries preserve and gives a same-occurrence completeness certificate. These results clarify the information supplied by a partial description. The constitutive account adds the actual unit enactment and its interpreted relations rather than identifying a whole by an inventory alone.

10 The explanatory force of enacted constitution

The positive argument begins with an actual organization, not a finished image awaiting a recipient. Reception, operative retention, interpretation and uptake specify how contributions are present and usable in an encounter. Complete-enactment identity identifies that organized activity with the occurrence, including its character. The whole is therefore neither an additional output nor an inner observer's subsequent inspection.

This identification has substantive organizational commitments. An unread archive differs

from actual uptake; a live estimate differs from a recollection; a source label copied without a realizing route differs from implemented occasion binding. A change to one of these relations can alter the proposed current organization despite preserved ingredient values or output accuracy. The linked witness makes those distinctions explicit in an application.

The account also explains how retained scaffolding and current content can differ without becoming disconnected. Dispositions constrain current interpretation through actual operations. Some yield a presently incorporated image, expectation or affective qualification; others influence the construction without appearing as separately presented items. The current field is the organization of what is taken up, while the complete enactment includes the realization and relevant powers through which that organization exists.

This is an identity argument within a constitutive framework. Its philosophical warrant lies in locating experiential presence in the actual organized activity that interprets the contributions, rather than appending an unspecified experiential object after that activity is complete. Its mathematical statements articulate the consequences and realization requirements of that identification. They distinguish a genuine within-unit whole from unrelated capacities, a partial description and a surrounding container without treating a processing score as the identity's proof.

The question whether a nominated process is a contributor remains meaningful. It is answered by comparing its actual relations with the complete target organization. If the scent binder omits the recollection currently qualifying the encounter, it omits part of that occurrence. If a reconstruction preserves those relations faithfully in fewer descriptive variables, it need not omit them. Completeness concerns constitutive coverage, not the size of a diagram or the length of a description.

The account thereby gives a determinate answer at its stated scope. For the qualifying unit, the experiencing occurrence is the complete actual organization, and its current field consists in the interpreted incorporation enacted there. No additional witness is required to turn an otherwise complete organization into the occurrence it already constitutes.

11 Conclusion

Whole-field constitution requires an account of how contributions participate in an actual occurrence. Enacted scaffolding supplies that account through complete-enactment identity, current incorporation and unit unity. The linked realization witness specifies one actual construction while allowing distributed implementation and overlapping roles. The within-unit result then identifies the complete qualifying enactment with the occurrence itself.

The scent and melody cases show why constituent values, source roles and temporal modes must be preserved together. Retained scaffolding can shape a field without every memory becoming current content; later retrieval can concern an occurrence without completing it retrospectively. Common-prefix invariance preserves the earlier event against later loss, and the predictive compatibility condition retains the difference between a current projection and complete organization.

The resulting explanation is positive and unified: a qualifying unit's experience is its actually enacted interpretive organization, with its current relations and contributions, rather than a further product presented to a separate observer. The explicit framework premises and complete-realization requirement state the conditions under which that whole-field account applies.

A Content summaries and same-occurrence completeness

Let V be a finite comparison universe of nominated phenomenal constituent tokens, and let $C(e) \subseteq V$ be the nonempty nominated contents of occurrence e . This representation abstracts from the organization and modes in which the constituents occur. Define the unindexed existential summary

$$\mathcal{J}(K) \iff \exists e \ K \subseteq C(e), \quad \emptyset \neq K \subseteq V. \quad (6)$$

For the family $\mathcal{F} = \{C(e)\}$, the true queries form the downward closure $\mathcal{J} = \downarrow \mathcal{F}$ of its nonempty subsets.

Proposition A.1 (Finite inverse family). *If V is finite, all content-set families inducing exactly $\mathcal{J}$ are the families $\mathcal{G}$ satisfying*

$$\text{Max}(\mathcal{J}) \subseteq \mathcal{G} \subseteq \mathcal{J}. \quad (7)$$

Their number is $2^{|\mathcal{J}| - |\text{Max}(\mathcal{J})|}$.

Proof. Every member of $\mathcal{G}$ witnesses itself, so belongs to $\mathcal{J}$. Every maximal $A \in \mathcal{J}$ must lie in some $B \in \mathcal{G}$; maximality forces $B = A$. Conversely, including every maximal member recovers all of $\mathcal{J}$, since each member lies below a maximal member in the finite family. Including only members of $\mathcal{J}$ adds nothing outside it. Each nonmaximal member can independently be included or omitted, giving the count. $\square$

For maximal witnessed contents $\{a, b, c\}$ and $\{c, d\}$, there are nine nonempty true queries and two maximal members, hence 128 compatible content-set families. Overlap at c does not supply a witness for $\{a, b, c, d\}$. The summary also discards multiplicity when distinct occurrences have the same nominated content set. A field's organized realization is therefore additional information beyond this existential summary.

For a fixed independently identified occurrence, define $\mathcal{J}_e(K)$ by $K \subseteq C(e)$. This supports an exact relative certificate.

Proposition A.2 (Same-occurrence extent). *If $\mathcal{J}_e(B)$ holds and $\neg \mathcal{J}_e(B \cup \{x\})$ holds for every $x \in V \setminus B$, then $C(e) = B$ relative to V .*

Proof. The positive premise gives $B \subseteq C(e)$. Any $x \in C(e) \setminus B$ would make $B \cup \{x\} \subseteq C(e)$, contradicting its negative premise. $\square$

The negative premises require actual warrant; failure to report an item is not their logical equivalent. This certificate concerns the contents of the fixed occurrence. The enacted account instead supplies its law-relative constitution through the complete unit realization and current incorporation. Neither method replaces a relational organization with an unstructured item list.

B Compatibility with complete predictive identity

Fix an exact intrinsic carrier X and its full native contract. Let $q_\infty : X \rightarrow Z_\infty$ be the all-finite-futures predictive quotient with the required labelled operations, records and successor structure.

Proposition B.1 (Full-A2 compatibility). *If full A2 applies to two nominations of the same complete phenomenal organization with the same actual phenomenal point, their complete labelled pointed predictive objects are isomorphic. If a function $f : X \rightarrow Y$ is asserted to be a fixed phenomenal property under A2 and the enacted correspondence, then f is constant on q_∞ fibres. Equivalently, there is a function $\tilde{f}$ on attained predictive classes such that $f = \tilde{f} \circ q_\infty$.*

Proof. Compose one structural identification with the common phenomenal organization and the inverse of the other to obtain the pointed labelled isomorphism. Equal predictive classes receive equal assigned pointed phenomenal organization, so any fixed property of that organization agrees on the fibre. Conversely, fibre constancy makes $\tilde{f}(q_\infty(x)) = f(x)$ well-defined. $\square$

The last statement is a general factorization criterion. For a payload $v : W \rightarrow V$ and target $F : W \rightarrow P$, the failure of a contextual relation R to factor through v does not establish that F fails to factor through it. On binary pairs, $R(a, b) = (a, b)$, $v(a, b) = a$ and $F(a, b) = a$ omit context b without omitting an F distinction. The relevant obstruction is an equal- v /different- F pair. In an A2 application, only properties actually claimed as phenomenal are subject to the stated correspondence; an arbitrary operational flag does not become a phenomenal predicate by its name.

References

- Tim Bayne and David J. Chalmers. What is the unity of consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans, editor, *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation*, pages 23–58. Oxford University Press, 2003. URL <https://consc.net/papers/unity.pdf>.
- Jeremy Rodgers. Constituted agency: Self-authorship, local control, and conscious participation, 2026a. URL <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23581587>. Author manuscript dated 22 October 2026.
- Jeremy Rodgers. Block universe and shadow theory: Source, history, and enacted temporal reality, 2026b. URL <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23604713>. Version 1.0, 23 October 2026.
- Jeremy Rodgers. Shadow theory and consciousness: Awareness, perspectival realization, and the source-to-experience problem, 2026c. URL <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22853774>. SPC-2, version 2 publication edition, 20 September 2026. Chapters 16–17.
- Jeremy Rodgers. Experience as enacted scaffolding: A relational constitutive account within shadow theory, 2026d. Unpublished manuscript, 23 October 2026.
- Jeremy Rodgers. Experienced temporal passage: Enacted scaffolding and the organization of succession, 2026e. URL <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23591626>. Author manuscript dated 23 October 2026.